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ABSTRACT
This study examines the extent to which the abnormal performance of active Australian small-cap
equity fund managers, previously documented by Chen et al. (2010), is associated with broker
recommendations. Our empirical evidence supports the investment value of broker
recommendations, showing statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns both pre and post
broker recommendation dates. We find that a factor-mimicking portfolio based on broker
recommendations results in a 48 basis point reduction in annual alphas estimated from a Carhart
(1997) four-factor model (from 58 to 54 basis points a month). Using transaction-level data, buy
trades following recommendations earn statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns of
1.56 percent after 60 days. Overall, we find evidence suggesting that broker recommendations play
an important role in the investment decisions of small-cap fund managers, and these account for an
economically significant component of the monthly alphas.
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1. Introduction
The recent abnormal performance by Australian small-cap equity fund managers (see Chen et al.
(2010), Gallagher and Looi (2006)) prompts the question of whether small-cap managers are
genuinely well-informed.1 Our paper is primarily empirical, though it has its theoretical motivation
in information economics. Active equity fund managers are known to conduct in-house research
and establish relationships with company management in attempts to beat the benchmark index.
These research and relationship-building activities are costly, and potentially give small-cap
managers an information advantage over other investors. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argue that
markets prices must be sufficiently noisy to allow traders and investors who engage in costly
information search to recover these costs, or else there is no incentive to become informed. This
information advantage might contribute to the significant alphas their portfolios have achieved in
recent years (see Chen et al. 2010). In addition to their own research, fund managers also rely on
their broker panels for timely access to valuable information and trade execution services. Thus,,
their observed alphas may be partly derived by trading on the basis of broker recommendations,
which are also known to possess information content. Brokers are an important information
gateway that enable fund managers to trade on other opportunities as a means of exploiting
valuable private information in a timely manner. Accordingly, this study explores whether smallcap equity fund outperformance is correlated with managers following the recommendations of
brokers, as well as the extent to which broker recommendations influence the investment decisions
of Australian funds trading in small cap stocks. Our research has important practical implications
for active portfolio management because it is very much in the spirit of the alpha capture hedge
fund strategies developed by Marshall Wace in 2002 (the Trade Optimized Portfolio System)
which uses computer algorithms for analysing and evaluating brokers’ best tips.
This study makes a number of contributions to the empirical literature. First, we extend the
work of Chan et al. (2006), through the use of robust methods to compute abnormal returns, with a
focus on short-term horizons for returns around broker recommendation dates. This is in light of
findings by Kothari and Warner (2006) that misspecification is common in long-horizon event
studies. Furthermore, we use a large and representative sample of broker recommendations to
confirm the findings of Chan et al. (2006) that broker recommendations possess information
content within the Australian market. Second, we provide a link between broker recommendations
and the value derived by small-cap equity fund managers. There exists an extensive literature on
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1 Chen et al. (2010) find evidence of small-cap managers’ stock selection ability with risk-adjusted abnormal
returns of between 59.6 and 76.1 basis points per month. Furthermore, Gallagher and Looi (2006) find
evidence that fund managers are better at exploiting potential mispricing for the most liquid of small-cap
stocks (ranked 101st to 150th in market capitalisation) on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX).
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the investment value of broker recommendations, including Womack (1996) and Barber et al.
(2001). However, no study to our knowledge tests whether information asymmetry is one of the
drivers of small-cap equity fund outperformance. We test this by using broker recommendations as
a proxy for valuable information, and investigate the extent to which these recommendations affect
the investment decisions of small-cap equity fund managers. Third, our research extends the widely
adopted four factor Carhart (1997) model applied to mutual funds, using a fifth factor controlling
for information asymmetry available from connections to the brokerage industry. To the best of our
knowledge, no published paper has extended the Carhart model with a fifth factor, nor included a
factor of this specification in measuring risk-adjusted performance.
Initially, performance is analysed through returns-based models using a representative
dataset of 34 active institutional Australian small-cap equity funds. We also extend the traditional
factor models of Jensen (1968), Fama and French (1992) and Carhart (1997) to incorporate broker
recommendations as an additional factor.2 This factor model extension confirms that a component
of the significant alphas documented in Chen et al. (2010) can be attributed to an investment
strategy based on broker recommendations. In addition to returns-based performance models,
transaction-based measures are used to determine the extent to which equity fund managers trade in
small cap stocks on the basis of recommendation levels. This approach represents a significant
improvement to holdings-inferred trades observed over quarterly or monthly intervals (for example,
see Chen et al. (2000) for the U.S. and Pinnuck (2003), for Australia). We also use a number of
innovative approaches to analyse the transaction-based performance of small-cap equity managers,
including their performance sensitivity around recommendation levels, research coverage levels
and timing factors.
The findings on returns-based performance models are consistent with those of Chen et al.
(2010) in that small-cap equity managers possess stock selection ability. Using a Carhart (1997)
model, we show small-cap managers earn economically and statistically significant alphas of 58
basis points a month. Furthermore, the addition of a broker recommendation mimicking factor
portfolio to the Carhart (1997) model reduces alpha by 48 basis points per annum (i.e., from 58 to
54 basis points a month), although it continues to be statistically significant. This is important also
from an economic perspective, where the average management expenses of small-cap funds are
about twice the size of the decay in alpha when we apply a broker mimicking factor. In other
words, the alpha generated using the five-factor model which accounts for a proxy of information
asymmetry represents almost half the annual average management expense ratio for the funds.
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of
literature and the hypotheses. Section 3 outlines the data used in this study, while Section 4

Chan and Faff (2003) test the importance of liquidity, in addition to factors for the market return,
size, book-to-market and momentum, in explaining Australian equity returns. They find that stocks
with lower liquidity have higher returns.
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provides an outline of the research design, and this is followed by the empirical results as well as a
number of robustness tests in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.

2. Background and Hypotheses
Brokerage houses expend considerable resources to collect, analyse and publish
information on stocks to investors. Grosman and Stiglitz’s (1980) Sell-side analysts are also known
to develop strong relationships with the management of the companies they cover. In spite of
regulation which prohibits the selective disclosure of material information by sell-side analysts,3
research analysts are often perceived to have an information advantage over other investors given
their perceived proximity and access to company management. This may be attributed to either
their superior ability in analysing and processing public information, or by acquiring private
information before other market participants. The significant stock price reaction upon the
announcement of a recommendation is interpreted as recommendations having information content.
Broker research coverage has been documented to explain information asymmetries. Arbel
et al. (1983) first discovered a ‘neglected firm effect’ where firms with minimal research coverage
experience higher returns. These returns persist after controlling for stock size, which is important
given that smaller firms tend to have lower analyst coverage. Dhiensiri and Sayrak (2005) find that
the value of a recommendation revision is inversely related to the number of analysts following a
firm, which is also similarly supported by Kelly and Ljungqvist (2007). This notion that stocks
with lower research coverage possess a greater degree of information asymmetry, potentially
provides opportunities for small-cap equity managers to earn excess returns.
An ‘Initiating’ recommendation on a stock represents the first coverage of that stock by a
broker. Given a lack of prior information, Chan et al. (2006) posit that ‘Initiating’
recommendations have greater information content and price response upon their announcement.
Demiroglu and Ryngaert (2008) find that ‘neglected’ stocks with no prior research coverage in the
past year experience abnormal returns of up to 4.82 percent upon announcement. Although these
authors acknowledge their result is partially attributed to an initiation with favourable information
content, it suggests an information asymmetry for firms prior to their first analyst coverage.
Similarly, Irvine (2003) finds that the incremental price impact of an initiation of coverage is 1.02
percent greater than the price reaction for a recommendation on a stock that is already covered.
There is also evidence of this in the Australian market by Chan et al. (2006), which shows that
returns on initiating buy (sell) recommendations are significantly greater (less) than zero over the
six months following their release.
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Such regulations include Regulation Fair Disclosure (Regulation FD) in the United States and the
Continuous Disclosure requirements in Australia. In addition, the Securities Exchange Commission in 2003
undertook enforcement action with respect to ten investment banks that led to the Global Settlement. The
SEC actions were brought with respect to the investment banking entities having improper influence on
securities research in the brokerage divisions of these firms.
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In the Chan et al. (2006) study, recommendations are classified as ‘Initiating’ if a particular
broker has not published a recommendation in the past one two or three years4, and ‘Continuing’ if
otherwise. Furthermore, ‘Virgin’ recommendations are a subset of ‘Initiating’ recommendations
and are the first coverage of that stock by any broker. Chan et al. (2006) expect ‘Virgin’
recommendations to have the greatest information content. However, their finding differs to Irvine
(2003), as the share price reactions of ‘Virgin’ recommendations are not significantly different
from ‘Continuing’ or ‘Initiating’ recommendations.
The literature generally finds that broker recommendations have investment value. Beneish
(1991) and Stickel (1995) find significantly positive (negative) stock price reactions to buy (sell)
recommendations. Broker recommendations are also found to have predictive power with respect
to stock returns (see Elton et al. (1986), Womack (1996) and Barber et al. (2001)). Australian
evidence also indicates that brokers have stock-picking ability (see Aitken et al. (2000)).
The literature has also investigated changes, rather than the absolute level of analyst
recommendations, and their impact on stock returns (see Elton et al. (1986) and Womack (1996)).
Jegadeesh et al. (2004) find that the quarterly change in consensus recommendation level is also a
robust predictor of returns. Research on investment strategies, formed around recommendations,
has also documented abnormal returns (Barber et al. (2001)).
There is limited literature on the value of broker recommendations with respect to equity
funds. Industry surveys reveal that most funds employ their own in-house analysts to provide
private research coverage of stocks. In addition, funds themselves have access to company
management in the same way that sell-side research analysts do. The ability of equity fund
managers to conduct their own private research, and possibly obtain information from company
management, suggests that fund managers may be informed. However, a study by Brown et al.
(2008) examines the extent of recommendation motivated trades and finds that mutual funds ‘herd’
into (out of) stocks with consensus upgrades (downgrades). Similarly, Chan et al. (2005) finds that
the extent of such herding is greater with increased information uncertainty, which is proxied by
the dispersion in analyst forecasts. These two studies provide evidence that mutual funds rely
heavily on the public information provided through broker recommendations.
An alternative view proposed by Irvine et al. (2007) is that sell-side analysts ‘tip’ their
institutional clients prior to recommendation release. Their joint finding that (i) institutional trading
increases significantly in the days prior to recommendation date and that (ii) these trades earn
positive abnormal returns provides some support for the tipping hypothesis. However, given the
gap in the literature linking broker recommendations and equity funds, it is appropriate to test how
public information, such as broker recommendations, are used in the investment decisions of
Australian small-cap funds, in light of recent evidence demonstrating outperformance.
In this study, we empirically investigate five hypotheses:
4

Chan et al. (2006) use three different periods of time to determine if a recommendation is initiating, namely
whether there was a recommendation by the same broker in the previous one, two or three years.
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Hypothesis 1
Broker recommendations are short-term predictors of stock returns and possess information
content. Initiating recommendations have greater information content and share price reactions
upon announcement than continuing recommendations.
Hypothesis 2
Small-cap equity managers mimic broker recommendations in their investment decisions; hence
the alpha earned by these managers can be (partly) attributed to the information contained in
recommendations.
Hypothesis 3
Active Australian small-cap equity managers trade on the basis of recommendation levels and
subsequently earn significant abnormal returns on these trades.
Hypothesis 4
Active Australian small-cap equity managers build up positions in stocks with upcoming
recommendations and earn subsequent abnormal returns from these positions.
Hypothesis 5
Research coverage levels are inversely related to the level of abnormal returns earned from smallcap equity manager trades.

3. Data
Small-cap funds in Australia generally target stocks that are constituents of the S&P/ASX300
Index (hereafter ASX 300) but lie outside of the S&P/ASX 100 Index (hereafter ASX 100). These
stocks comprise the S&P/ASX Small Ordinaries Index (hereafter Small Ordinaries). Based on
ASSIRT estimates, the total funds under management of the small-cap funds industry at 30 April
2007 is approximately A$4,561 million, or approximately seven percent of the total Australian
equity market capitalisation.
In the period 1994-2008 broker coverage has increased over time. The total number of
brokers in the market has increased, as too has the mean number of brokers following a Small
Ordinaries index stock, which increased from 2.54 in 1994 to 5.13 in 2008. A total of 650 stocks
were at some stage included in the small ordinaries index during our sample period. The average
number of unique brokers that issued a recommendation on these 650 stocks at some stage during
the 15 year period was 7.76. Small-cap stocks are generally associated with lower research analyst
coverage levels than large-caps stocks.
Broker recommendations are sourced from the IBES database. We include stocks ranked
between 101st and 300th in market capitalisation between November 1993 and December 2008 in
our recommendation database, resulting in a sample of 801 ‘small caps’. Of these, 762 unique
stocks had recommendations in IBES, with a total of 21,231 unique recommendations. This forms
the full recommendation sample, in which a total of 64 unique brokers provide recommendations.
5

Most brokers use an expanded classification system with recommendations such as underweight,
overweight, underperform and outperform. For consistency, the IBES database converts these to a
5-point classification system, which we use in this study. The categories are Strong Buy, Buy,
Hold, Underperform and Sell.
Consistent with the literature, considerable asymmetry exists in the number of buy and sell
recommendations, with Strong Buys and Buys combined outnumbering Sells and Underperforms
by a factor of 2.8 in the full sample. This asymmetry is even greater in Virgin recommendations,
where the buy/sell ratio is 4.2. The direction of this bias to recommend stocks as buys is in line
with economic incentives that exist for analysts to issue favourable recommendations. It is also
consistent with the notion that a self-selection bias exists, where firms tend to initiate coverage on
firms with favourable prospects as a mechanism to generate trading commissions.
The Mercer Manager Performance Analytics (Mercer) database includes the monthly
returns of 40 active Australian small-cap equity funds, on a pre-expense basis. Following Chen et
al. (2010), each fund in our sample is required to have a minimum of 12 consecutive monthly
returns between January 1991 and March 2004 to allow model estimation. The resulting subsample
of 34 active small-cap funds has consecutive returns that range from 14 to 158 months.
We also use the Portfolio Analytics (PA) database which includes month-end portfolio
holdings and daily transactions of a subset of the small-cap equity fund managers. The PA database
was constructed using an ‘invitation’ approach to the largest equity investment managers (on the
basis of funds under management) in Australia. Each manager was requested to provide on a
confidential basis, information on their largest pooled active Australian equity funds that were open
to institutional investors.
The PA database includes month-end portfolio holdings of 13 active Australian small-cap
equity funds, which are managed by 11 separate managers. The holdings are from March 1995 to
June 2004. This represents a sample of 38,261 individual holdings of stocks by the small-cap fund
managers. As at the end of the sample period in 2004, the PA funds had a total of A$0.76 billion in
funds under management. Hence the PA database accounts for approximately 16.7 percent of the
entire small-cap fund universe (by funds under management). Furthermore, the mean monthly fund
size by net asset value (NAV) throughout the sample period is A$78.5 million. The daily
transaction data for the small-cap fund managers include the aggregate daily trades of 12 active
Australian small-cap equity funds, which are managed by ten unique fund managers. On a
transaction level, the full sample is made up of 43,700 aggregated daily trades over a seven-year
period spanning February 1997 to June 2004.
Rather than analysing each trade separately, we follow Chan and Lakonishok (1995) and
group individual trades into trade packages.
<<INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE>>
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Table 1 provides summary statistics for the trade packages formed from the daily transactions of
the small-cap fund managers in the PA database. Of the 43,700 aggregated daily trades comprising
the full sample, 15,060 trade packages are formed using the five-day definition. Of these, buy
packages outnumber sell packages, with 8,525 buy packages and compared to 6,535 sell packages.
Within the full sample, 52 (51) percent of the buy (sell) packages are executed within a single day
and approximately 76 percent of all trade packages (i.e., both buy and sell trades) are executed
within four days.
To examine the behaviour and performance of small-cap fund managers around broker
recommendations, we form a recommendation subsample of trade packages, based on stocks with
data from our recommendations file. In forming the sub-sample, we require stocks to be
continuously traded over the past year, as momentum characteristics are required to calculate
DGTW-adjusted daily abnormal returns around trade packages. This results in a ‘recommendation
subsample’ of 2,800 trade packages, 1,572 buys and 1,228 sells. The sample size is considerably
smaller than the full sample; hence we also calculated descriptive statistics for this set to ensure no
selection bias has occurred. The results are quantitatively similar to those in Table 1, though in
general the value of the packages for this reduced set of recommendations is somewhat larger than
those for the full sample.5
In addition to analyst recommendations and fund manager data, stock-specific information
such as price, dividend and capitalisation change data are needed to calculate returns. For this, ASX
daily price data are sourced from the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA).
These include daily opening and closing prices, daily high and low prices and also daily trading
volumes and values. In addition, a daily dilution factor is included for each stock to take into
account changes in shares outstanding due to events such as dividends, rights issues or stock splits.
Accounting information such as book-to-market ratios for multi-factor models are sourced from the
Aspect Financial database.

4. Research Design
In this section, we outline our research design used to test whether broker recommendations have
information content and investment value, as proposed in Hypothesis 1. After classifying
recommendations by level and type, we conduct an event study to investigate the share price
reaction and the presence of statistically significant abnormal returns around the recommendation
date. For robustness, two approaches are used to compute abnormal returns - the traditional market
model, as well as a control-firm approach first developed by Daniel et al. (1997).

5
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4.1 Classifying Recommendations by Level and Type
Initially, recommendations are grouped into three categories by level. These are (i) Strong Buys or
Buys, (ii) Holds, and (iii) Underperform or Sell. The IBES classification system is used to group
recommendations by level.
Following this, recommendations are classified according to their Type, as per Chan et al.
(2006). An Initiating recommendation is the first recommendation made on a stock by a particular
broker, where other brokers currently cover the stock. A Virgin recommendation is the first
recommendation made on a stock by any broker. Thus, Virgin recommendations are a subset of
Initiating recommendations. As the IBES database commences in 1993 for Australian stocks, we
use 1993 as a ‘holdout’ year and classify Virgin or Initiating stocks if no prior recommendations
were issued during that year. The remaining recommendations are classified as Continuing.
4.2 Abnormal Returns around Recommendation Date – Market Model
An event study methodology with a short-horizon window is used to compute the abnormal returns
around recommendation date. While Chan et al. (2006) focus on six-month returns following
recommendation, we focus on the abnormal returns in the two weeks around a stock’s
recommendation date. We estimate the familiar market model during a 180 day ‘estimation period’
prior to each recommendation date, using the Small Ordinaries index values to calculate the market
return. Abnormal returns (ARs) on a stock for the ten days around a recommendation date are
computed as the difference between the actual return and the expected return as predicted by the
market model.6 Based on the entire sample of recommendations, mean daily ARs are computed by
averaging across recommendations in the sample and the ARs are then summed to form cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs).
4.3 DGTW-Adjusted Abnormal Returns
A DGTW control-firm approach to benchmark stock returns is adopted as an additional robustness
check. This approach is motivated by the characteristics of the underlying stocks held in fund
portfolios examined in Daniel et al. (1997). These include well-known market anomalies such as
size, book-to-market and momentum. Although the DGTW method was developed to measure
mutual fund performance, this benchmarking approach can also be applied to computing abnormal
returns on individual stocks.
To compute abnormal returns around recommendation date, we use daily DGTW-adjusted
alphas constructed by Fong et al. (2008) based on the Pinnuck (2003) approach. The Pinnuck
(2003) approach modifies the Daniel et al. (1997) approach for an Australian context and is

6

Following the event study approach suggested by MacKinlay (1997), we include a separation between the
estimation (t = -200 to t = -20) and event windows (t = -10 to t = +10), which prevents event-related activity
in the stock price from influencing the estimated market model parameters.
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constructed on a stock universe consistent with our benchmark specification. The daily DGTWadjusted alphas can be expressed algebraically as:

ARi ,t  ri ,t  rt DGTW (i )

(1)

where ARi,t is the abnormal return on the underlying stock of recommendation i at time t, ri,t is the
actual return on underlying stock of recommendation i on day t and rtDGTW(i) is the return of a
characteristic matched benchmark portfolio assigned to the underlying stock of recommendation i
across the characteristics of size, book-to-market and momentum.
Following this, the mean abnormal return is computed based on daily abnormal returns
averaged across all recommendations in the sample and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs)
around recommendation date are calculated.

4.4 Returns-Based Performance Measures
Returns-based performance measures are used to determine whether small-cap equity managers
have the ability to outperform passively selected benchmark portfolios. The literature has proposed
a number of factor models in risk-adjusting the returns of mutual funds, including the approaches
advocated by Jensen (1968), Fama and French (1992) and Carhart (1997). The purpose of these
multi-factor models is to control for strategies that are known to generate alpha in capital markets.
The reliance on multi-factor risk models is therefore an attempt to measure the true value of
services rendered by active fund managers, and thereby account for alpha that is otherwise
delivered from well-known risk factors shown to explain stock returns in the cross-section. Studies
by Chen and Knez (1996) and Admati and Pfleiderer (1997) argue the importance of accurately
benchmarking performance in the compensation of investment managers. Indeed, in the Australian
literature, asset pricing tests by Chan and Faff (2003) and Gharghori, Chan and Faff (2007) are
recent examples that propose extensions to the Fama-French three-factor model with respect to
liquidity (proxied by trade volume) and default risk, respectively.
A number of commonly used single and multi-factor models are employed in our study,
namely the Jensen approach, Fama-French, Carhart, and our new model that further accounts for
asymmetries related to broker recommendations (a test of Hypothesis 2). Further details of these
models are outlined in Chen et al. (2010). An innovation of this study is that it is the first to account
for broker recommendations as a potential source of alpha generation by active small-cap equity
funds.
In constructing a broker recommendation factor BMS or ‘Buy minus Sell’, mimicking
portfolios are formed on a monthly basis, which take a long position in stocks with newly issued
Strong Buy or Buy recommendations during the month, and a short position in stocks with newly
issued Underperform or Sell recommendations in the month.

9

In addition, BMS is formed from a recommendation sample whose stocks were members of
the Small Ordinaries Index in the month of recommendation. This is to ensure that only pure
‘small-cap’ stocks which fall under the investment mandate of small-cap managers are included.
In any month, it is possible for several brokers to issue conflicting recommendation levels
on a stock. It is also possible for a single broker to revise the recommendation level on a stock from
a buy to a sell and vice versa. For stocks which had ‘conflicting’ recommendations, the consensus
recommendation for that month is used to classify the stock. Within our sample of 4,770 buy or sell
recommendation/months, we identified only 160 instances of ‘conflicting’ recommendation/months
and applied the monthly consensus recommendation level to these cases.
The five-factor model used in this study is thus specified as follows;

ri ,t  ai  biSOrm,t  biHMLt HMLt  biSMBSMBt  biPR1YR PR1YRt  biBMS BMSt  ei ,t

(2)

The HML, SMB, and PR1YR factors are constructed as per the Carhart (1997) four-factor model.
BMS represents a ‘Buy minus Sell’ broker recommendation factor, and biBMS is its corresponding
loading coefficient.
4.5 Justification of Market Benchmarks Specified
Specification of an appropriate benchmark and model is extremely important, in light of recent
studies which suggest that inferences of abnormal performance are highly sensitive to choice of
benchmarks and models, such as Kothari and Warner (2001)7. In particular, the chosen market
portfolio should adequately reflect the investment styles of the fund managers in the sample.
Typically, small-cap fund managers are benchmarked against the Small Ordinaries index. Indeed,
an analysis of their holdings shows that over 70 percent of funds are invested in the Small
Ordinaries Index constituent stocks. Further, Lehmann and Modest (1987) also stress the
importance of a consistent approach when constructing benchmark factors. The broker
recommendation BMS factor has been constructed using Small Ordinaries stocks, as this
appropriately reflects the underlying stocks small-cap equity managers invest in. Based on both an
analysis of the holdings and the way BMS was constructed, the Small Ordinaries Index is initially
used as the market risk factor in returns-based performance evaluation models.
However, an issue that arises is that the Carhart (1997) mimicking factors that we have
access to are constructed from stocks within the All Ordinaries Index. To incorporate the use of a
wider benchmark and to ensure consistency in benchmark construction, the All Ordinaries Index is
also used as a robustness test. The holdings data also shows approximately 13 percent of holdings
by value are micro-caps and approximately 4 percent of holdings are large-cap stocks in the ASX
100. For this reason, we also create a customised ‘Balanced Index’ which accurately reflects the
proportionate holdings of small-cap equity managers in the sample. The Balanced Index is
7
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constructed using the weighted returns on the ASX 100, Small Ordinaries and Micro-cap stocks
(defined as stocks outside of the ASX 300 but within the All Ordinaries indices) with weights of
4/90, 73/90 and 13/90 respectively.
In summary, three key market benchmark specifications are used;
(1) Small Ordinaries Index
(2) All Ordinaries Index
(3) A Self-constructed Balanced Index

4.6 Broker Recommendations and Small-Cap Manager Trades
Previous studies have examined fund manager trades by focussing on trades inferred from quarterly
or monthly portfolio holdings. However, as pointed out by Gallagher and Looi (2006), this
approach fails to capture trading activity during the month. Furthermore, Chen et al. (2000) argue
that trades are more likely to signal private information over the passive decision of holding a
stock.
Thus, we use a refined level of data, the daily transactions of small-cap equity managers to
test Hypothesis 3 that broker recommendations influence fund manager trades, as well as
Hypothesis 4 that small-cap managers are informed and build up positions in stocks with an
upcoming recommendation. As mentioned above, consistent with the approach of previous smallcap equity fund studies, such as Gallagher and Looi (2006), Comerton-Forde et al. (2006) and Chen
et al. (2010), trades are grouped based on the trade package methodology of Chan and Lakonishok
(1995). This is motivated by the fact that fund managers tend to split up large trades to minimise
transactions costs through price impact, and to disguise the execution of their trades.

4.6.1 Trades on the Basis of Recommendation Level
Under the assumption that there is information content in broker recommendations, we propose in
Hypothesis 3 that broker recommendations influence the trades of small-cap equity fund managers
in two ways. First, small-cap equity managers trade on the basis of recommendation levels. That is,
managers should be more likely to execute a buy trade on stocks with a Buy recommendation or
execute a sell trade on stocks with a Sell recommendation. Second, we expect significant abnormal
returns to be earned on trades in which a recommendation direction is followed.
To test the extent that small-cap managers trade on the basis of recommendation levels, a
database of trade packages which have taken place around a recommendation date is constructed. A
trade which had a Strong Buy or Buy (hereafter buy), or an Underperform or Sell (hereafter sell)
recommendation in the same month is included in this database. Following this, we partition trade
packages on the basis of recommendation level and trade type.
Using the holdings data from the PA database, we further split the full sample based on
whether a fund manager had an ‘existing position’ in the stock when the trade occurred, or whether
11

the trade package represented a ‘new position’ in the stock for a particular fund manager. This is
motivated by the idea that managers are more likely to rely on the information content of broker
recommendations if they do not have a prior position in the stock.

4.6.2 Returns around Trade Packages
Following the partitioning above, we examine the abnormal returns earned on trades which have
followed the recommendation direction using the DGTW approach outlined in section 4.3. First,
daily DGTW-adjusted abnormal returns are computed in the 60 days before and after the trade
package date. The mean daily DGTW-adjusted ARs and the CARs are then calculated for the
sample.

4.6.3 The Information Advantage of Small-Cap Fund Managers
If recommendations possess information content and if small-cap fund managers are informed as
proposed in Hypothesis 4, then we expect to observe trading activity prior to the release of a
recommendation. That is, we expect fund managers to have built up positions in stocks where
information is due to be released to investors through a recommendation. We also expect that
small-cap fund managers earn significant abnormal returns from these positions. Again, we use the
trade package methodology of Chan and Lakonishok (1995).
First, instances of managers taking a position prior to recommendation release are
identified. Accordingly, a trade package is flagged if the last day of the package occurs in a 10-day
period prior to either a Buy or Sell recommendation. Hold recommendations are omitted from this
analysis, given the expectation that they do not contain the same level of information as a Buy or
Sell recommendation. We initially define a 10-day period as an indication of managers taking a
prior position, however other time periods are also used in robustness checks.
After identifying instances of prior positions by small-cap equity managers, a number of
trade-related metrics are constructed to analyse the relative magnitude of these trade packages. This
is to ensure that small-cap fund managers take substantial positions in stocks with an upcoming
recommendation.
Transaction weight
Within the sample, the small-cap equity funds vary substantially in Net Asset Value
(NAV), which has implications on the size of the trades executed. Hence it is more meaningful to
examine the relative weight of the trade as a proportion of NAV rather than the absolute value of
the trade package. The transaction weight is defined as;

TransactionWeight ijt 

TradePackageValue ijt
NAV jt

(3)

where Trade Package Valueijt is the dollar value of the trade package i made by fund manager j in
month t, and NAVjt is the net asset value of fund manager j during month t.
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Relative Position – Prior and Post Trade
Fund managers are likely to have existing positions in the stocks in which they trade. For
this reason, we are also interested in the relative weight of the overall position in a stock both prior
to and following a trade, rather than the weight of the trade package alone. The relative weight of
the overall position, both prior to trade and post trade, can be defined as;

RelativePosi tion ( Prior )ijt 

RelativePosi tion ( Post )ijt 

HoldingVal ueijt 1
NAVjt

TradePackageValue ijt  HoldingVal ueijt 1
NAVjt

(4)

(5)

where Trade Package Valueijt is defined as in Equation (3) and Holding Valueijt-1 is the value of
fund manager j’s holding in the stock underlying trade package i during month t-1, given that
holdings in the PA database are month-end values.
Overweight Position
Position weights in a stock may also vary across different stocks, depending on their
market capitalisation. For instance, it is expected that positions will be greater in smaller stocks.
Hence we also examine the size of a trade package in the context of a stock’s weight in the index.
We define an overweight (relative to the index) metric as;

Overweightijt  RelativePosi tion ( Post ) ijt  Weight itXSO

(6)

where Relative Position(Post)ijt is as per Equation (5), and WeightitXSO is the weight of a stock
within the Small Ordinaries Index in the corresponding month t.
After analysing a number of trade-related metrics, we compute mean daily DGTWadjusted abnormal returns around each prior position trade and average these across the N trade
packages in which a prior position was taken, rather than the entire sample. We also compute
CARs for the 30- and 60-day periods, again using the last day of a trade package as the reference
date.

4.7 Impact of Coverage Levels on Transaction-Based Performance
In this section, we outline our approach in testing the information advantage of small-cap equity
managers by examining research coverage levels in conjunction with transaction-based
performance measures. This is motivated by the ‘neglected firm effect’ first documented by Arbel
et al. (1983) and more recently by Irvine (2003).
If small-cap equity managers are genuinely informed, then we would expect coverage
levels to be inversely related with the abnormal returns earned from their trades, as proposed in
Hypothesis 5. This is based on the notion that managers are better able to exploit information
asymmetry and potential mispricing in stocks with less publicly available information.
Motivated by the approach of Dhiensiri and Sayrak (2005), we initially define sell-side
research coverage levels for all the underlying stocks of the trade packages of small-cap funds.
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Based on the recommendations sample, the frequency of issued recommendations varies between
different brokers. However, as suggested by Kecskes and Womack (2007), an analyst will at least
provide a yearly earnings forecast for the stocks they cover. Given this, we define the ‘coverage
level’ as the total number of brokers issuing a recommendation on a stock within the same year.
Following this, we analyse the performance of trade packages with a split around coverage
levels. We use the trade packaging methodology and methods for computing mean daily and
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), consistent with the approach detailed above.

5. Empirical Results
5.1 Value of Brokers’ Recommendations
Table 2 presents the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around recommendation date based on a
market model approach. All Continuing recommendations earn statistically significant postrecommendation CARs that are consistent with the direction of their forecast, regardless of
recommendation level (assuming that a hold recommendation is a disappointment). Initiating and
Virgin recommendations are expected to contain greater information content, given there is limited
prior information on a stock. Thus a greater price reaction is expected, as proposed in Hypothesis 1.
Consistent with this, Initiating hold and underperform/sell recommendations are more negative in
the period following the recommendation than those of the Continuing group. Virgin
recommendations

are

however

entirely

inconsistent

with

expectations.

Virgin

buy

recommendations have CARs after 10 days of -1.55%, while the hold and underperform groups
have positive, albeit insignificant, returns. Interestingly, there is some evidence of statistically
significant negative returns prior to Initiating and Continuing sell recommendation’s release, with
CARs in the 10 days before the recommendation date of -0.97% and -1.59% respectively. This
finding supports the notion of sell side analysts ‘tipping’ institutional clients, consistent with Irvine
et al. (2007). Overall, our findings based on the market model approach are consistent with those of
a previous Australian study by Chan et al. (2006).

<<INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE>>

As a robustness check, cumulative abnormal returns around recommendation date are also
computed based on DGTW-adjusted daily alphas. These results are very similar to those for the
market model, hence they are not reported in detail.8 The minor differences are that the negative
CARs in the period after the Strong Buy/Buy Virgin recommendations are less significantly

8

These results are available from the corresponding author on request.
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negative under the DGTW approach, while some Initiating Strong Buy or Buy recommendations
have significantly positive CARs (at the 5 percent level) in the period after the recommendation.9

5.2 Returns-Based Performance Measures
Single and multi-factor models are used to evaluate small-cap fund manager performance. Each
model involves a regression of monthly pre-expense returns of a fund in excess of the monthly riskfree rate against one or more factors. Table 3 reports the results of a number of returns-based
performance evaluation models. The magnitude of Jensen’s alpha provides an estimate of the level
of fund manager skill with respect to stock selection ability after controlling for market risk. Panel
A indicates that small-cap equity funds outperform the Small Ordinaries Index by 82 basis points a
month, or 9.8 percent annually. In addition, the beta on the market factor indicates that small-cap
fund manager returns are highly sensitive to the Small Ordinaries Index. This is not surprising,
given that fund managers hold diversified portfolios of stocks, the majority of which are
constituents of the Small Ordinaries.

<<INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE>>

The results from the Fama-French (1992) model in Panel B and the Carhart (1997) model
in Panel C show that the coefficient on the SMB ‘small minus big’ size factor is significantly
positive, indicating the presence of a small-firm return anomaly, which partly explains the alphas
reported in Panel A. Taken together, the SMB and the HML factors (i.e., the Fama-French factors)
cause small-cap equity manager returns to drop from 82 to 69 basis points per month. Similarly,
Panel C suggests that small-cap equity managers also adopt momentum strategies, buying (selling)
stocks with positive (negative) past six-month returns which also contributes to alphas earned.
After controlling for the additional factor based on the Carhart (1997) four-factor model
(i.e., momentum), alpha drops by 11 basis points to 0.58 percent a month, although it remains
economically (i.e., 7.0% per annum) and statistically significant. Our results are consistent with
Chen et al. (2009), indicating a pronounced level of stock selection ability amongst small-cap
equity fund managers, even after controlling for market anomalies such as size, book-to-market
ratio and momentum.
Panel D presents results for a five-factor model where the BMS broker recommendation
factor is introduced. Overall, the findings in Panel D confirm Hypothesis 2, i.e., broker
recommendations play a role in the investment decisions of small-cap equity managers and
contribute to their alphas. The excess return of 58 basis points per month in the Carhart (1997)
model is reduced to 54 basis points per month when the BMS factor is added.
9

We also estimated the statistical significance of the results presented in Table 2 recognising that the
standard errors might be biased due to clustering, as suggested by Petersen (2009). Our statistical tests are
essentially identical under either approach.
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The loading coefficient on the Small Ordinaries market factor is reduced from 0.8781 to
0.8132 with the introduction of the BMS factor. This can be explained by the correlation that exists
between the BMS factor and the Small Ordinaries market factor10. The addition of the BMS factor
also causes an increase in the coefficient on the size, book-to-market and momentum factor in
Panel C.11

5.3 Transactions-Based Performance Measures
We now turn to an analysis of fund manager data at the trade level to ascertain the impact of broker
recommendations on the trading behaviour and performance of small-cap equity managers. Based
on Hypothesis 3, it is expected that small-cap equity managers trade on the basis of broker
recommendations. That is, managers should be more likely to execute a buy trade on stocks with a
Buy recommendation or execute a sell on stocks with a Sell recommendation.
Table 4 (Panel A) presents the results on transaction-based performance measures,
partitioned on the basis of recommendation levels. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, an examination of
the CARs reveals that small-cap fund managers earn highly significant CARs on purchases where
the underlying stock had a buy recommendation. For example, a buy trade package on a stock with
a Buy recommendation earns a cumulative abnormal return of 1.56 percent in the 60-day period
following the last day of the buy trade package. The pattern of the CARs for this set of securities
suggests that broker Buy recommendations are for stocks with positive momentum, or that fund
managers become aware of the recommendation prior to its publication in the IBES database,
because the pre-recommendation CARs are a significantly positive 4.37%. In contrast, the stocks
sold by small-cap fund managers after a broker Sell recommendation experienced insignificant
positive CARs in the order of 0.47 percent in the 60-day period following the last day of the sell
trade package.

<<INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE>>

We investigate whether taking a prior position in a stock occurs by examining the daily
trades of small-cap equity managers prior to recommendation date.

10

We confirm that multicollinearity is not an issue in the model by conducting further analysis to control for
the correlation between BMS and the market factor. Our findings indicate that BMS continues to be
statistically significant after accounting for its correlation with the market factor. These results are available
from the corresponding author on request.
11 We also estimated the returns-based factor models using a “balanced index” as the market factor. The
“balanced index” comprises stocks which reflect the underlying holdings of small-cap equity managers, as
detailed in Table 3. Under this benchmark specification essentially the same results detailed in Table 3 are
encountered. The various models have high explanatory power, and the alphas are statistically and
economically significant across all model specifications. These results are available from the corresponding
author on request.
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We calculate a number of trade-related metrics to analyse the relative magnitude of the
trade packages. The aim is to test whether managers take substantial positions in stocks prior to a
recommendation.
Table 5 shows trade packages partitioned by their type (i.e., buy or sell) as well as the
recommendation level on the underlying stock. The trade-related metrics are similar across all
groups, with the vast majority of trades taking place in stocks for which the manager has an
existing position. For example, over 96 percent (98%) of the sell trade packages following buy
(sell) recommendations have an existing position in the stock, indicating that very few of the sell
trade packages are indeed short sales. Further, 85 percent (90%) of the buy trade packages
following a Buy (Sell) recommendation have an existing position in the stock, while the mean
transaction weight as a proportion of NAV is approximately 0.43 (0.32) percent. Given that the
average number of stocks held by each manager is approximately 46 (and therefore that most of the
existing positions will, by definition, be overweight relative to the weights in the small-cap index)
and the majority of trade packages already have an existing position in the stock, the magnitude of
the trades alone as a proportion of NAV is substantial. Following the trade, the overweight position
for buy trades, for which there is a Buy recommendation (1.03), is greater (as expected), than the
overweight position for a sell trade following a sell recommendation (0.73). Buy trades following a
Buy recommendation are larger, as expected, than buy trades following a Sell recommendation.
However, in contrast, managers sell smaller quantities of stock following a Sell recommendation
than they do following a Buy recommendation. This finding is perhaps because small-cap fund
managers have a smaller proportion of NAV invested in stocks that receive unfavourable Sell
recommendations.

<<INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE>>

5.4 Coverage Levels and Transactions-Based Performance
Table 6 presents the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) earned around trade packages with a split
based on coverage levels. Specifically, Panel A reports the CARs around buy packs for the
respective coverage level groups, and Panel B reports CARs for the sell packs. Consistent with
Hypothesis 5, sell trades in stocks with lower coverage generated significant CARs post-trade. For
the 356 sell trades made in stocks with a zero coverage level, the CARs are a significantly negative
(-2.64) percent after 60 days. In contrast, the CARs an insignificant 0.99 percent after 60 days on a
sell trade where the stock had more than nine brokers following it. Overall, the CARs follow a
decreasing trend as the number of brokers decrease.
This result is consistent with Dhiensiri and Sayrak (2005), who find that recommendations
are less informative as the number of analysts following a firm increase. Our findings on sell trades
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support the notion that small-cap equity fund managers exploit the lower levels of information
available on stocks with low research coverage, thereby earning statistically significant abnormal
returns.
In contrast, and inconsistent with expectations, Panel A reports the performance of buy
packs through an analysis of the CARs around the last date of a buy trade package. For buy trades,
the magnitude of the CAR following the trade is positively related to broker coverage. Where there
are more than nine brokers covering a stock, the post-trade CAR is significantly positive (4.28%),
while buy packs for which there is low analyst coverage have insignificant returns. A possible
explanation for this finding is that there needs to be a strong consensus among several brokers in
relation to buys, before market participants follow the recommendation, given the propensity for a
buy imbalance in broker recommendations. In contrast, sell transactions are more informative when
there is low coverage.

<<INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE>>

5.5 Robustness Tests
To strengthen the validity of the findings in this study, a number of robustness tests are conducted.
These involve altering the research design to ensure that our results are robust to differences in
methodology, as well as alternative econometric techniques.

5.5.1 Controlling for the Correlation between BMS and the Market Factor
We control for the correlation between the BMS broker recommendation factor and the market risk
factor in the following manner. Firstly, the Small Ordinaries Index is regressed on the BMS factor,
and the residuals from this regression, which represent the portion of BMS that is uncorrelated with
the Small Ordinaries market factor (which we term BMS*) are used in a five-factor model in which
BMS* is used in place of BMS in Equation (2).
We also repeat the process, substituting the All Ordinaries Index and a Balanced Index in
place of the Small Ordinaries Index. The regression results12 indicate that across all the two
benchmark specifications, the coefficient on the BMS factor continues to be significant. Hence,
after controlling for the correlation between BMS and the market factor, broker recommendations
continue to play a significant role in the investment decisions of small-cap managers.

5.5.2 Long-Only Portfolios in Five-Factor Model
The broker recommendation factor BMS is formed on the assumption that fund managers are
equally able to take short and long positions in stocks. However, an analysis of the holdings data
reveals that short positions are rare or non-existent. For instance, Saar (2001) observes that funds
12

These results are available from the corresponding author on request.
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generally do not short sell, to avoid risking unlimited losses if the stock price goes up. Furthermore,
the charters of many funds restrict the usage of short sales.
Based on this, we re-construct the BMS factor using long-only portfolios that better reflect
the actual portfolio allocation decisions of small-cap funds.
To construct a long-only BMS factor, a long position is taken in newly issued buy
recommendations each month. For stocks with both buy and sell recommendations, the consensus
recommendation is applied for that month and a long position is taken if its consensus
recommendation is a buy. Following this, returns-based factor models are estimated. These results
confirm the robustness of our findings, as the significance of the BMS factor and the results as a
whole remains unchanged.13

5.5.3 Changing Risk due to the Technology Boom and Bust
The sample period used in the returns-based performance regressions encompass both the
technology boom and its subsequent bust in 2001. As a robustness test, we control for possible
differences in the risk and levels of information asymmetry attributable to this event. Given that the
bust occurred in 2001, we divide the sample in half to capture the lead up ‘boom’ period prior to
and excluding 2001, as well as its subsequent ‘bust’ from 2001 onwards. This approach is chosen
over a regression with calendar year dummies as it prevents over-specification of the models. The
results indicate that the magnitude and significance of alpha is highly sensitive to this event. 14
Furthermore, the results suggest that small-cap managers invested in the technology boom, with a
tilt towards growth stocks prior to 2001, as observed by a statistically significant negative
coefficient on the HML factor. This is observed across all model specifications. They also profited
from this, given the statistically significant alpha of 53 basis points per month prior to 2001 from
the five-factor model. Interestingly, we observe that the BMS factor is statistically significant prior
to the boom, but not after. This suggests that post-2001, small-cap managers were perhaps more
cautious and did not rely as much on the information provided by brokers for their investments.
Further, alpha is not statistically different to zero in the bust period.

6. Conclusion
Chen et al. (2010) find evidence of the stock selection ability of small-cap equity
managers, as they earn risk-adjusted abnormal returns of between 60 and 76 basis points per
month. The large magnitude of the alphas earned inevitably prompts the question of whether
returns can be explained through the information advantage of small-cap funds.
Our study contributes to the literature by jointly exploring the areas of broker
recommendations and small-cap equity funds to determine how valuable the recommendations are
in the fund management process. Given that the outperformance of these fund managers has been
13
14

These results are available from the corresponding author on request.
These results are available from the corresponding author on request.
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confirmed, this study is unique in that it seeks to understand the drivers behind such
outperformance, such as the information asymmetry between managers and investors in the market.
Initially, we confirm the findings of Chan et al. (2006) in that broker recommendations
possess investment value. We also show that the price reaction around Initiating recommendations
is not significantly different from ‘Continuing’ recommendations. These findings are confirmed
using two approaches of estimating abnormal returns, a traditional market model approach and a
DGTW-approach motivated by Daniel et al. (1997).
The findings on returns-based performance models are consistent with those of Chen et al.
(2010) in that small-cap equity managers possess stock selection ability. Using a Carhart (1997)
model, we show small-cap managers earn economically and statistically significant alphas of 58
basis points a month. Furthermore, the addition of a broker recommendation mimicking factor
portfolio to the Carhart (1997) model reduces alpha by 48 basis points per annum (i.e., from 58 to
54 basis points a month), although it continues to be statistically significant. We additionally test
the robustness of alpha across alternative benchmark specifications of the market factor. Our
transaction-based performance measures involve the examination of DGTW-adjusted cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs) around trades. We find that small-cap equity managers earn statistically
significant abnormal returns on trades that follow broker recommendations. Furthermore, managers
have a greater likelihood of trading on the basis of recommendation levels if they do not have an
existing position in a stock prior to the trade, presumably due a lack of information and company
relationships on these stocks.
Further, we find that the abnormal returns following small-cap equity manager sell trades
are inversely related to the number of analysts following a stock, whereas results are reversed for
buy trades. This confirms findings in the literature that sell trades are motivated by information and
allow managers to exploit mispricing when there is lower coverage levels, whereas buy trades are
informative only when there is a strong buy consensus recommendation among several brokers.
Finally, it is known that brokers and fund managers alike may have expertise in a particular
industry, which could result in an information advantage over market participants. For example,
Boni and Womack (2004) take an industry perspective when analysing broker recommendation
value and find that an analysts’ industry expertise provides incremental investment value. With this
in mind, it would be interesting to take industry expertise into account when examining the impact
of broker recommendations on small-cap funds.
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Table 1 – Summary Statistics for Transactions Data – Full Sample
Trade packages are defined as a fund manager’s successive trades in a particular stock within the same
direction (i.e., only a buy or sell in one package) until no trades are executed for a period of five consecutive
days. Panel A reports summary statistics for all buy trade packages, with a breakdown for the number of days
it took to execute the entire trade package. Panel B reports summary statistics for sell trade packages with a
similar breakdown. The sample is also split into quartiles based on trade package value.
Summary Statistics for Trade Packages Full Sample - February 1997 to June 2004
Panel A: Buys
1 day
Number of packages

2-4 days

5-8 days

>8 days

Total buy packs

4,452

1,984

1,206

883

8,525

52

23

14

10

100

Mean pack value $

201,480

321,056

497,848

1,088,375

363,097

Std dev pack value

390,549

452,681

602,517

1,258,422

643,128

% of buys

Q1

35,844

94,242

150,449

308,446

60,789

Median

92,428

186,114

313,254

640,422

159,540

202,500

371,431

581,005

1,370,171

385,700

Q3

Panel B: Sells
1 day
Number of packages
% of sells

3,336

2-5 days
1,633

5-8 days

>8 days

844

722

Total sell packs
6,535

51

25

13

11

100

Mean pack value $

227,940

339,028

505,967

895,512

365,361

Std dev pack value

488,489

563,481

639,539

1,140,198

663,890

35,866

71,589

117,374

241,349

59,409

Median

107,128

167,538

290,685

548,596

156,860

Q3

238,354

363,440

658,340

1,099,648

389,961

Q1
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Table 2 - Returns around Recommendation Date – Market Model Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs)
Table 2 presents the CARs around recommendation date, with a breakdown for Virgin, Initiating and Continuing recommendations, as well as by recommendation levels. The returns
for the 180 day period from t =-200 to t = -20 prior to each recommendation date are regressed against the return on the Small Ordinaries Index. The mean daily abnormal returns are
computed by averaging across recommendations and CAR[t,T] is the sum of mean daily abnormal returns between days t and T. All t-statistics and significance levels are calculated
using Newey West (1987) standard errors which adjust for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the residuals.

Event

Panel A: Virgin recommendations
Strong
Hold
Underperform/Sell
Buy/Buy

Event

Panel B: Initiating recommendations
Strong
Hold
Underperform/Sell
Buy/Buy

CAR[-10;0]
CAR[-10;0]
0.0108
-0.0074
-0.0158
-0.0014
-0.0004
-0.0084*
CAR[-9;0]
CAR[-9;0]
0.0098
-0.0095
-0.0102
-0.0016
0.0002
-0.0068
CAR[-8;0]
CAR[-8;0]
0.0101
-0.0083
-0.0090
-0.0013
0.0006
-0.0056
CAR[-7;0]
CAR[-7;0]
0.0106
-0.0064
-0.0071
-0.0011
0.0000
-0.0043
CAR[-6;0]
CAR[-6;0]
0.0106
-0.0056
-0.006
-0.0016
0.0004
-0.0024
CAR[-5;0]
CAR[-5;0]
0.0051
-0.0037
0.0034
-0.0007
0.0006
-0.0027
CAR[-4;0]
CAR[-4;0]
0.0006
-0.0015
0.0076
0.0002
0.0006
-0.0041*
CAR[-3;0]
CAR[-3;0]
0.0016
0.0014
0.0018
0.0003
0.0000
-0.0037
CAR[-2;0]
CAR[-2;0]
0.0061
-0.0026
-0.0033
0.0012
-0.0002
-0.0028
CAR[-1;0]
CAR[-1;0]
0.002
-0.0003
-0.0024
0.0003
-0.0001
-0.0021*
CAR[0;+1]
CAR[0;+1]
-0.0004
0.0021
0.0018
0.0011*
-0.0017**
0.0021
CAR[0;+2]
CAR[0;+2]
0.0013
0.0002
-0.0023
0.0013
-0.0021**
0.0008
CAR[0;+3]
CAR[0;+3]
-0.0059
0.0036
0.0051
0.0008
-0.0033***
-0.0011
CAR[0;+4]
CAR[0;+4]
-0.0133***
0.0007
0.0105
-0.0011
-0.0050***
-0.0035
CAR[0;+5]
CAR[0;+5]
-0.0108**
0.0035
0.0081
-0.0004
-0.0062***
-0.0042
CAR[0;+6]
CAR[0;+6]
-0.0140**
0.0016
0.0221
-0.0009
-0.0059***
-0.0080**
CAR[0;+7]
CAR[0;+7]
-0.0118
0.0015
0.0171
-0.0014
-0.0062***
-0.0100**
CAR[0;+8]
CAR[0;+8]
-0.0130*
0.0040
0.0052
-0.0025
-0.0063***
-0.0093**
CAR[0;+9]
CAR[0;+9]
-0.0143*
0.0024
0.0075
-0.0034*
-0.0067***
-0.0100**
CAR[0;+10]
CAR[0;+10]
-0.0155*
0.0048
0.0103
-0.0038*
-0.0074***
-0.0129***
***, ** and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% (two-tail) level, respectively. H0: CAR[t,T] = 0 and H1: CAR[t,T] ≠ 0.

Event
CAR[-10;0]
CAR[-9;0]
CAR[-8;0]
CAR[-7;0]
CAR[-6;0]
CAR[-5;0]
CAR[-4;0]
CAR[-3;0]
CAR[-2;0]
CAR[-1;0]
CAR[0;+1]
CAR[0;+2]
CAR[0;+3]
CAR[0;+4]
CAR[0;+5]
CAR[0;+6]
CAR[0;+7]
CAR[0;+8]
CAR[0;+9]
CAR[0;+10]

Panel C: Continuing recommendations
Strong
Hold
Underperform/Sell
Buy/Buy
0.0026**
0.0029**
0.0035***
0.0045***
0.0050***
0.0052***
0.0047***
0.0043***
0.0032***
0.0027***
0.0014***
0.0023***
0.0034***
0.0033***
0.0030***
0.0036***
0.0036***
0.0032***
0.0034***
0.0036***

-0.0022
-0.0023*
-0.0023*
-0.0024*
-0.0016
-0.0018
-0.0023**
-0.0020**
-0.0013*
-0.0011**
-0.0013***
-0.0025***
-0.0029***
-0.0032***
-0.0037***
-0.0041***
-0.0042***
-0.0041***
-0.0044***
-0.0049***

-0.0160***
-0.0160***
-0.0163***
-0.0164***
-0.0168***
-0.0157***
-0.0151***
-0.0118***
-0.0087***
-0.0041***
-0.0038***
-0.0060***
-0.0064***
-0.0074***
-0.0085***
-0.0090***
-0.0097***
-0.0099***
-0.0108***
-0.0109***
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Table 3 - Returns-Based Performance Measures – Multi-Factor Models
Table 3 presents the results derived from returns-based models, where b’s represent the loading coefficient on
their corresponding factor. The results for a single-factor model are presented in Panel A, Panel B reports the
results derived from a three-factor Fama-French (1992) model, Panel C reports results derived from a fourfactor Carhart (1997) model, Panel D reports results derived from our five-factor Broker Recommendation
model, specified as follows;
(2)
ri ,t  ai  biSOrm,t  biHMLt HMLt  biSMBSMBt  biPR1YR PR1YRt  biBMS BMSt  ei ,t
T-tests: H0 coefficient = 0. All t-statistics and significance levels are calculated using Newey West (1987)
standard errors which adjust for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the residuals of panel data. Note:
Alpha estimates are reported in decimal form.
Returns-based performance evaluation - Multi-Factor Models - March 1995 to March 2004
Mean
Median
Min
Max
Std. Dev.
Pos. Sig.
Neg Sig..
Panel A: Single Factor Model (Jensen's Alpha)
α
0.0082
0.0072
-0.0025
0.0260
0.0063
8***
0
βSO
0.8669
0.8450
0.5516
1.4315
0.2081
14
0
Adjusted R-squared
0.7068
0.6986
0.3527
0.9371
0.1547
Number of Months
50.6429
38
13
114
33.9652
Panel B: Three-Factor Model (Fama French 1992)
α
0.0069
0.0075
-0.0044
0.0209
0.0069
6***
0
βSO
0.8465
0.8478
0.5105
1.3616
0.1982
14
0
βHML
0.0595
-0.0058
-0.1271
0.6764
0.2186
3
0
βSMB
0.0301
0.0077
-0.0808
0.2360
0.1033
3
1
Adjusted R-squared
0.7098
0.6979
0.4037
0.9529
0.1525
Number of Months
50.6429
38
13
114
33.9652
Panel C: Four-Factor Model (Carhart 1997)
α
0.0058
0.0052
-0.005
0.0189
0.0064
6***
0
βSO
0.8781
0.8572
0.5129
1.3617
0.2133
14
0
βHML
0.0556
-0.0051
-0.13
0.6848
0.2147
2
0
βSMB
0.0977
0.0928
-0.071
0.3617
0.1317
4
1
βMOM
0.1003
0.0501
-0.0588
0.3909
0.1355
3
0
Adjusted R-squared
0.7185
0.7179
0.3555
0.9517
0.1671
Number of Months
50.6429
38
13
114
33.9652
Panel D: Five-Factor Model
α

0.0054

0.0050

-0.0135

0.0172

0.0072

5***

0

βSO

0.8132

0.7648

0.4934

1.2704

0.2375

13

0

βHML

0.0737

0.0526

-0.123

0.7286

0.2233

2

0

βSMB

0.1133

0.1146

-0.0609

0.3875

0.1365

5

1

βMOM

0.1108

0.0705

-0.0516

0.3849

0.1285

3

0

βBMS

0.0791

0.1403

-0.8183

0.6962

0.3425

3

0

Adjusted R-squared
0.7223
0.7178
0.4044
0.9518
0.1612
Number of Months
50.6429
38
13
114
33.9652
*** indicates significance at the 1% (two-tail) level, respectively, based on a Binomial test.
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Table 4 – Results from Transaction-Based Measures - CARs around Transactions
Table 4 presents cumulative abnormal returns calculated using the last day of the trade package as the
reference date. Abnormal returns are computed based on DGTW-adjusted daily alphas and the mean daily
abnormal return and cumulative abnormal returns are then computed.
All t-statistics and significance levels are calculated using Newey West (1987) standard errors which adjust
for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the residuals of panel data.
Transaction-Based Performance Measures - February 1997 to June 2004
CARs around Transactions by Recommendation Level and Trade Type
Buy Pack
Sell Pack
Event day
Buy
Sell
Buy
Sell
N
1248
324
1003
225
CAR[-60;0]
0.0437***
0.0355***
0.0389***
0.0085
(0.0069)
(0.0096)
(0.0079)
(0.0106)
CAR[-50;0]
0.0351***
0.0261***
0.0296***
0.0058
(0.0058)
(0.0094)
(0.0069)
(0.0108)
CAR[-40;0]
0.0276***
0.0193**
0.0261***
-0.0060
(0.0050)
(0.0086)
(0.0056)
(0.0088)
CAR[-30;0]
0.0196***
0.0115
0.0152***
-0.0050
(0.0042)
(0.0074)
(0.0044)
(0.0082)
CAR[-20;0]
0.0097***
0.0126**
0.0080**
-0.0097
(0.0031)
(0.0054)
(0.0034)
(0.0068)
CAR[-10;0]
0.0025
0.0029
0.0035
0.0013
(0.0022)
(0.0032)
(0.0023)
(0.0031)
CAR[0;10]
0.0045***
0.0024
0.0072***
-0.0021
(0.0017)
(0.004)
(0.0020)
(0.0033)
CAR[0;20]
0.0055**
-0.0031
0.0059**
0.0026
(0.0024)
(0.0044)
(0.0029)
(0.0058)
CAR[0;30]
0.0051
-0.0008
0.0032
0.0033
(0.0033)
(0.0051)
(0.0036)
(0.0072)
CAR[0;40]
0.0091**
0.0020
0.0012
0.0063
(0.0040)
(0.0061)
(0.0042)
(0.0082)
CAR[0;50]
0.0121***
0.0089
0.0027
0.0030
(0.0046)
(0.0071)
(0.0046)
(0.0092)
CAR[0;60]
0.0156***
0.0082
0.0025
0.0047
(0.0052)
(0.0076)
(0.0053)
(0.0096)
***, ** and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% (two-tail) level, respectively, based on T-tests
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Table 5 – Results from Transaction-Based Performance Measures
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics of the trade-related metrics used in analysing transaction-based
performance. The mean transaction weight is total value of the trade package divided by the fund’s Net Asset
Value (NAV), averaged across number of trade packages. This can be expressed as;

TransactionWeight ijt 

TradePackageValue ijt

(3)

NAV jt

where N is the number of trade packages, L is the total number of managers, NAVjt is fund j’s NAV in time t,
Trade Package Valueitj is the dollar value of the trade package i made by fund j at time t.
Relative Position (Prior) to trade is defined as a fund’s holding in a stock in the prior month as a proportion
of NAV in the current month. This is expressed as;

RelativePosi tion ( Prior ) ijt 

HoldingVal ueijt 1

(4)

NAVjt

Similarly, Relative Position (Post) trade is defined as the sum of a fund’s existing holding in a stock and the
trade package value as a proportion of NAV. This is expressed as;

RelativePosi tion ( Post ) ijt 

TradePackageValue ijt  HoldingVal ueijt 1
NAVjt

(5)

Overweight relative to index is weight of the stock underlying trade package i within the Small Ordinaries
Index subtracted from Relative Position (Post) computed as per Equation (5).
(6)
Overweightijt  RelativePosi tion ( Post ) ijt  Weight itXSO
Transaction-Based Performance Measures - February 1997 to June 2004
Panel A: All trade packages in recommendation subsample
Buy Transactions
Sell Transactions
Recommendation Level
Strong Buy/Buy
Underperform/Sell
Strong Buy/Buy
Underperform/Sell
N
1,111
302
854
190
N with existing stock position
% transactions with existing
position
Mean trade package size $
Mean Transaction weight
(% NAV)
Relative position - Prior to
Trade (% NAV)
Relative position - Post Trade
(%NAV)
Overweight Relative to Index
– post-trade position

948

272

823

187

85.33

90.07

96.37

98.42

344,624

249,453

325,623

313,774

0.43

0.32

0.34

0.28

1.55

1.63

2.16

2.03

1.98

1.95

1.82

1.75

1.03

0.87

0.87

0.73
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Table 6 – Coverage Levels and Transaction-Based Performance
Table 6 (Panel A) presents the CARs from the last day of a buy trade package, with a split around broker
coverage levels. N refers to the total number of brokers following the underlying stock of a particular trade
package, defined as number of unique brokers who have issued a recommendation within the same year.
Similarly, Panel B presents the results for sell packs. Abnormal returns are computed based on DGTWadjusted daily alphas. The mean daily abnormal return and cumulative abnormal returns between day t and T,
denoted as CAR[t,T], are computed by summing the mean daily abnormal returns from days t to T.
All t-statistics and significance levels are calculated using Newey West (1987) standard errors which adjust
for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the residuals of panel data.
Transaction-based performance by Coverage Level - February 1997 to June 2004
Panel A - Transaction-based CARs by Coverage Level for Buy Packs
Trade type

Buy Packs

Coverage level (no. of brokers)

0

N

1 to 3
559

1596

4 to 6
2107

CAR[-60;0]

0.0486***

0.0269***

0.0274***

CAR[-30;0]

0.0253***

0.0117**

CAR[-10;0]

0.0032

0.0020

CAR[0;10]

0.0013

CAR[0;30]
CAR[0;60]

7 to 9

>9

1371

101

0.0215***

0.0466**

0.0089***

0.0090*

0.0307*

-0.0013

-0.0005

0.0074

0.0009

0.0064***

0.0024

0.0040

0.0071

-0.0049

0.0088***

0.0042

0.0081

0.0044

-0.0062

0.0141***

0.0126*

0.0428**

Panel B - Transaction-based CARs by Coverage Level for Sell Packs
Trade type
Coverage level (no. of brokers)

Sell Packs
0

1 to 3

N

356

1139

CAR[-60;0]

0.0163

0.0119

CAR[-30;0]

-0.0098

CAR[-10;0]

0.0018

CAR[0;10]
CAR[0;30]

4 to 6
1686

7 to 9

>9

1106

106

0.0197***

-0.0019

0.0217

0.0024

0.0064*

-0.0024

0.0204

0.0049

0.0000

-0.0007

0.0171***

-0.0023

-0.0034

0.0030*

0.0015

0.0042

-0.0038

-0.0092

0.0044

-0.0020

-0.0022

CAR[0;60]
-0.0264*
-0.0113
0.0047
0.0026
0.0099
***, ** and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% (two-tail) level, respectively, based on T-tests with NeweyWest standard errors
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